The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
The relationship between economic development and democracy has been a subject of debate among scholars and policymakers for decades. Some scholars have argued that economic development leads to democracy by creating a middle class, increasing education, fostering civil society, and reducing inequality. However, the opponents of economic development have maintained that economic development does not necessarily cause democracy, and that other factors including culture, history, institutions, and external influences, are more important. Against these divergent views, this paper explores the theoretical aspect of economic development using the case of Brazil and South Korea.
Both Brazil and South Korea have experienced different trajectories of economic development and democratization. Therefore, they offer valuable insights into the complex interactions between economic development and democracy. The thesis statement for this paper is that economic development can facilitate democracy, but it is not a sufficient condition for it. The paper uses the theoretical framework provided by Seymour Martin Lipset by comparing and contrasting his arguments with other relevant perspectives. The subsequent sections of the paper offers a theoretical discussion of the relationship between economic development and democracy. In addition, they analyze how economic development has influenced the development or consolidation of democracy in Brazil and South Korea. More importantly, it offers a succinct summary of the study findings and their implications for future studies. The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal work, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, is a useful starting point for this discussion. Lipset (1959) posited that economic development leads to democracy through a series of social, economic, and cultural changes that create a conducive environment for democratic institutions to flourish. He identifies factors such as urbanization, education, and a strong middle class as key indicators of a society’s readiness for democratic transition (Lipset, 1959). The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
The discussion encompassing a connection between monetary turn of events and a majority rules government fixates on whether or not financial improvement is a vital condition for a vote based system or just a facilitator. Lipset (1959) contended that monetary improvement prompts a vote based system by forming a working class that requests political privileges and by advancing the advancement of establishments that safeguard individual privileges and opportunities. Nonetheless, a few researchers have tested this view, contending that financial improvement is neither a vital nor an adequate condition for majority rule changes (Lachapelle, Levitsky, Way & Casey, 2020). They highlight situations where nations with elevated degrees of financial improvement have neglected to change to a vote based system or where nations with low degrees of monetary advancement have effectively progressed to a majority rules government.
One of the difficulties to the monetary turn of events and a vote based system speculation is the job of common society in advancing majority rule changes. Mainwaring (2001) posited that vote based changes require a basic limit of common society preparation and that financial improvement alone may not be adequate to make the essential circumstances for majority rule changes. On the same note, Rød, Knutsen and Hegre (2020) maintained that vote based advances are bound to happen when common society is solid and ready to assemble against dictator systems. In any case, this view has been reprimanded for distorting the perplexing connection between financial turn of events and a majority rule government. A few researchers contend that the causal connection between the two is not direct, and that there are numerous different elements that can impact vote based changes, like the job of common society, worldwide entertainers, and verifiable inheritances (Przeworski et al., 2000). Moreover, the idea of monetary advancement itself is challenged, with some contending that specific types of improvement, like extractive ventures or top level salary imbalance, can really sabotage vote based foundations. The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
The debate surrounding the relationship between economic development and democracy can be traced back to the seminal work of Martin Lipset who proposed that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset, 1959). Lipset (1959) argued that economic development creates favorable conditions for democracy by increasing social mobility, education, urbanization, communication, and political participation. Further, he suggested that economic development reduces social conflict and extremism by creating a more diverse and tolerant society (Lipset, 1959). The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
The theory that Lipset (1959) postulated has been widely influential and empirically supported by many studies that have found a positive correlation between economic development (measured by indicators such as GDP per capita, income distribution, industrialization, etcetera) and democracy (measured by indicators such as political rights, civil liberties, electoral competition, etcetera.) (Rød et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the theory has been challenged by many critics who have pointed out its limitations and exceptions. Some scholars have argued that economic development is not a necessary condition for democracy, as there are examples of poor countries that have achieved or maintained democracy (such as India, Costa Rica, Botswana, etc.) and rich countries that have remained authoritarian (such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia, China, etc.) (Geddes 2004). Others have argued that economic development is not a sufficient condition for democracy, as there are other factors that can hinder or facilitate democratization, such as culture, history, institutions, external influences, etc. (Levitsky & Way, 2020). Moreover, some have questioned the causal direction of the relationship between economic development and democracy, suggesting that it may be democracy that causes economic development rather than vice versa (Papaioannou & Siourounis, 2020). The Relationship between a Majority Rule Government and an Economic Turn of Events: Contextual Studies of Brazil and South Korea
This paper explores the case of Brazil and South Korea in order to analyze the connection between economic growth and democracy. Brazil and South Korea are two countries that have experienced significant economic development over the past few decades, but have had very different experiences with democratic transition. Brazil underwent a transition to democracy in the 1980s after a period of military dictatorship, while South Korea transitioned in the 1990s after decades of authoritarian rule.
In the case of Brazil, economic development played a significant role in creating the conditions for democratic transition. The growth of a strong middle class and the expansion of education and urbanization contributed to a growing demand for political participation and accountability. However, the transition was also facilitated by the role of civil society, including labor unions and religious groups, who organized mass protests and pushed for democratic reforms. In addition, international pressure from the United States and other countries played a role in supporting democratic transition.
Scholars have pointed several factors that might explain Brazil’s struggles with democratic consolidation (Balk et al. 2021). One of the factors is the country’s extreme inequality, which has created a wealthy elite that is able to dominate political power and resist democratization. The second factor is the Brazil’s political culture, which is characterized by patronage and corruption. Additionally, some scholars have argued that Brazil’s historical legacy of slavery and authoritarianism may be hindering its ability to fully consolidate democracy (Huntington, 1984).
In South Korea, by contrast, economic development has been accompanied by a successful transition to democratic rule. In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea was ruled by a military dictatorship that promoted rapid economic growth but repressed political dissent. However, beginning in the 1980s, South Korea underwent a peaceful democratic transition that was accompanied by continued economic growth. Today, South Korea is considered a consolidated democracy with strong institutions and a vibrant civil society.
Researchers have highlighted a few factors that might assist with making sense of South Korea’s effective progress for a majority rules system. One is the country’s solid common society, which had the option to prepare and pressure the public authority for popularity based change (Bowles, 2020). Another factor is the Confucian culture, which values schooling, social concordance, and a solid state, yet additionally underlines the significance of moral trustworthiness and public help. Moreover, a few researchers have contended that South Korea’s verifiable tradition of imperialism and tyranny might have really pre-arranged the country for a majority rules government, by making areas of strength for an and a feeling of public personality (Lachapelle et al. 2020).
South Korea’s transition was largely driven by domestic factors, including a growing opposition movement and a split within the ruling elite. While economic development played a role in creating a middle class and increasing demands for political participation, it was not the only or even the most important factor in the transition. In fact, some argue that South Korea’s economic development was actually facilitated by the authoritarian regime, which provided stability and support for export-oriented growth.
One of the fundamental contentions for the beneficial outcome of financial improvement on majority rules government is that it changes the social construction and makes a sufficiently enormous working class as the social premise of a vote based system (Lee, 2020). The working class is supposed to request more political cooperation, social equality and responsibility from the public authority, as well as to oppose dictator suppression. This contention appears to apply well to the instance of South Korea, where the development of a solid working class was a critical variable behind the favorable to a majority rules government development that overturned the tactical system in 1987 (Moore, 1992). The working class was generally made out of metropolitan experts, business people and understudies who profited from the commodity arranged industrialization procedure sought after by the dictator government since the 1960s. Nonetheless, they additionally became disappointed with the political debasement, social imbalance and basic freedoms infringement that went with the fast development. They united with other gatherings, like laborers, ranchers and strict activists, to frame an expansive alliance that tested the system through mass fights, strikes and common insubordination.
Interestingly, the instance of Brazil shows that monetary improvement doesn’t be guaranteed to prompt areas of strength for a firm working class that upholds a majority rule government. Brazil additionally experienced great financial development under military rule from 1964 to 1985, in light of import-replacement industrialization and state mediation. In any case, this development was profoundly inconsistent and packed in specific districts and areas, making a divided and heterogeneous working class (Naidu et al. 2020). Besides, the tactical system co-selected a few portions of the working class by offering them political portrayal, social advantages and monetary open doors. Thus, the working class was partitioned and conflicted about vote based system, with some supporting the resistance groups and others backing the system or swearing off governmental issues. The change to a vote based system in Brazil was not driven by a well-known uprising, but rather by an arranged settlement among elites who confronted mounting monetary and political emergencies in the mid-1980s.
One more contention for the beneficial outcome of monetary advancement on vote based system is that it cultivates comprehensive financial establishments that favor success through mechanical developments, schooling and the admiration of law and order (Papaioannou, 2020). Comprehensive financial establishments should make motivators for useful exercises, energize advancement and rivalry, and safeguard property freedoms and agreements. These organizations are likewise helpful for a majority rules government since they diminish lease chasing and defilement, increment responsibility and straightforwardness, and enable residents and common society. This contention appears to fit well with the instance of South Korea once more, where comprehensive monetary foundations were step by step laid out after democratization. The vote based government carried out changes to diminish state mediation, advance market contest, upgrade corporate administration, reinforce overall sets of laws and grow social government assistance. These changes worked on the productivity and value of the economy, as well as the quality and authenticity of a majority rules system.
Nonetheless, the instance of Brazil shows that financial improvement doesn’t necessarily bring about comprehensive monetary establishments that help a majority rules government. Brazil’s monetary foundations remained generally extractive under military rule and after democratization (Naidu et al., 2020). Extractive monetary foundations are described by restraining infrastructure power, lease looking for conduct, frail property privileges and agreement requirement, and low degrees of advancement and instruction. These foundations ruin financial development and a majority rule government since they make contortions and shortcomings in the economy, increment imbalance and neediness, encourage defilement and support, and subvert responsibility and cooperation. Regardless of certain endeavors at change by just states, Brazil’s monetary organizations remained tormented by personal stakes, administrative hindrances, political shakiness and social clash.
Overall, the case studies of Brazil and South Korea suggest that economic development is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic transition. The specific ways in which economic development interacts with political institutions and civil society are crucial in determining the success of democratic transitions. In addition, the role of international actors and historical legacies cannot be overlooked in understanding the complex relationship between economic development and democracy. While the case studies provide valuable insights into this relationship, more research is needed to understand how it operates in different contexts and under different conditions.
While certain researchers contend that monetary improvement is a vital driver of majority rule changes, others underscore the significance of common society, verifiable inheritances, and global entertainers. The contextual analyses of Brazil and South Korea give significant experiences into how monetary improvement cooperates with political establishments and common society to work with or block majority rule changes. Be that as it may, these cases likewise feature the requirement for a more nuanced comprehension of the connection between monetary turn of events and a majority rules government, and the need to think about the particular settings and conditions under which this relationship works. Further examination is important to extend how we might interpret this complicated issue and to illuminate strategies that advance both financial turn of events and majority rule administration.
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